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Abstract 
I analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the 
economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The 
analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called 
network externalities. I discuss their sources and their effects on pricing and market 
structure. I distinguish between results that do not depend on the underlying industry 
microstructure (the 'macro' approach) and those that do (the 'micro' approach). I analyze 
the issues of compatibility, coordination to technical standards, interconnection and 
interoperability, and their effects on pricing and quality of services and on the value of 
network links in various ownership structures. I also briefly discuss the issue of interconnec- 
tion fees for bottleneck facilities. 
I .  In t roduct ion  2 
Network industries play a crucial role in modem life. The modem economy 
would be very much diminished without the transportation, communications, 
information, and railroad networks. This essay will analyze the major economic 
features of  networks. In the course of the analysis it wil l  become clear that many 
important non-network industries share many essential economic features with 
network industries. These non-network industries are characterized by strong 
complementary relations. Thus, the lessons of  networks can be applied to 
]Plenary session address, E.A.R.I.E. conference, Chania, Greece, September 1994. I thank Larry 
White for helpful comments. 
2The literature on networks is so extensive that it is futile to attempt to cover it. This paper discusses 
only some issues that arise in networks and attempts to point out areas in which further esearch is 
necessary. 
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industries where vertical relations play a crucial role; conversely, the economic 
and legal learning developed in the analysis of vertically related industries can be 
applied to network industries. 
2. Classification of networks 
Formally, networks are composed of links that connect nodes. It is inherent in 
the structure of a network that many components of a network are required for the 
provision of a typical service. Thus, network components are complementary to 
each other. Fig. 1 represents the emerging information superhighway network. 
Clearly, services demanded by consumers are composed of many complementary 
components. For example, interactive ordering while browsing in a 'department 
store' as it appears in successive video frames requires a number of components: a 
database ngine at the service provider, transmission of signals, decoding through 
an interface, display on a TV or computer monitor, etc. Clearly, there are close 
substitutes for each of these components; for example, transmission can be done 
through a cable TV line, a fixed telephone line, a wireless satellite, PCN, etc.; the 
in-home interface may be a TV-top box or an add-on to a PC, etc. It is likely that 
the combinations of various components will not result in identical services. Thus, 
the information superhighway will provide substitutes made of complements; this 
is a typical feature of networks. 
Fig. 2 shows this feature in a simple star telephone network. A phone call from 
A to B is composed of AS (access to the switch of customer A), BS (access to the 
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Fig. 2. A :simple star network. 
switch of customer B), and switching services at S. Despite the fact that goods AS 
and BS look very similar and have the same industrial classification, they are 
complements  and not substitutes. 3 
Networks where services AB and BA are distinct are named 'two-way' networks 
in Economides and White (1994). Two-way networks include railroad, road, and 
many telecommunications networks. When one of AB or BA is unfeasible, or does 
not make economic sense, or when there is no sense of direction in the network so 
that AB and BA are identical, then the network is called a one-way network. In a 
typical one-way network, there are two types of components, and composite goods 
are formed only by combining a component of each type, and customers are often 
not identified with components but instead demand composite goods. For example, 
broadcasting and paging are one-way networks 4 
The classification i network type (one-way or two-way) is not a function of the 
topological structure of the network. Rather, it depends on the interpretation of the 
structure to represent a specific service. For example, the network of Fig. 3 can be 
interpreted as a two-way telephone network where SA represents a local switch in 
city A, A i represents a customer in city A, and similarly for SB and Bj. 5 In this 
network, there are two types of local phone calls AiSAA ~ and BiSBB ~, as well as 
3AS and BS can also be components of substitute phone calls ASC and BSC. 
4The 1994 spectrum auction will allow for a large two-way paging network. 
5In this network, we may identify end-nodes, such as A i and B, end-links, uch as ASA and SsB~, the 
interface or gateway SAS ~, and switches SA and SR. 
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Fig. 3. A simple local and long distance network. 
long distance phone call AiSASBBj. We can also interpret he network of Fig. 3 as 
an automatic teller machine network (ATM). Then a transaction (say a withdrawal) 
from bank Bj from ATM Ai is AflASBB j. Connections AflaA k and BjSsB ~ may be 
feasible but there is no demand for them. 
We have pointed out earlier that the crucial relationship in both one-way and 
two-way networks is the complementarity between the pieces of the network. This 
crucial economic relationship is also often observed between different classes of 
goods in non-network industries. In fact, Economides and White (1994) point out 
that a pair of vertically related industries is formally equivalent o a one-way 
network. Fig. 4 can represent two industries of complementary goods A and B, 
where consumers demand combinations A~Bj. Notice that this formulation is 
formally identical to our long-distance network of Fig. 3 in the ATM interpreta- 
tion. 
The discussion so far was carried under the assumption of compatibility, i.e. that 
various links and nodes on the network are costlessly combinable to produce 
demanded goods. We have pointed out that links on a network are potentially 
complementary, but it is compatibility that makes complementarity actual. Some 
network goods and some vertically related goods are immediately combinable 
because of their inherent properties. However, for many complex products, actual 
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Fig. 4. A pair of vertically related markets. 
complementarity can be achieved only through the adherence to specific technical 
compatibility standards. Thus, many providers of network or vertically related 
goods have the option of making their products partially or fully incompatible with 
components produced by other firms. This can be done through the creation of 
proprietary designs or the outright exclusion or refusal to interconnect with some 
firms. 
Traditionally, networks were analyzed under the assumption that each network 
was owned by a single firm. Thus, economic research focused on the efficient use 
of the network structure as well as on the appropriate allocation of costs 6 In the 
70s, partly prompted by the antitrust suit against AT&T, there was a considerable 
amount of research on economies of scope, i.e. on the efficiency gains from joint 
operation of complementary components of networks. 7 
Once one of the most important networks (the AT&T telecommunications 
network in the US) was broken to pieces, economic research focused in the 80s 
and 90s on issues of interconnection a d compatibility. Similar research on issues 
of compatibility was prompted by the reduced role of IBM in the 80s and 90s in 
the setting of technical standards in computer hardware and software. Significant 
reductions in costs also contributed and will contribute to the transformation 
toward fragmented ownership in the telecommunications sector in both the United 
States and abroad. Costs of transmission have fallen dramatically with the 
introduction of fiberoptic lines. Switching costs have followed the fast cost 
6See Sharkey (1995) for an excellent survey. 
7See Baumol et al. (1982). 
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decreases of microchips and integrated circuits. These cost reductions have 
transformed the telecommunications i dustry from a natural monopoly to an 
oligopoly• The same cost reductions have made many new services, such as 
interactive video and interactive games, feasible at low cost. Technological change 
now allows for joint transmission of digital signals of various communications 
services. Thus, the monopoly of the last link closest o home is in the process of 
being eliminated, 8 since both telephone lines and cable lines (and in some cases 
• 910 
PCS and terrestrial satellites) will provide similar services. ' 
In a network where complementary as well as substitute links are owned by 
different firms, the questions of interconnection, compatibility, interoperability, 
and coordination of quality of services become of paramount importance. We will 
examine these issues in detail in the next few sections. We first focus on a 
fundamental property of networks, i.e. the fact that they exhibit network exter- 
nalities. 
3. Network externalities 
Networks exhibit positive consumption and production externalities. A positive 
consumption externality (or network externality) signifies the fact that the value of 
a unit of the good increases with the number of units sold. To economists, this fact 
seems quite counterintuitive, since they all know that, except for potatoes in Irish 
famines, market demand slopes downwards. Thus, the earlier statement, "the value 
of a unit of a good increases with the number of units sold," should be interpreted 
as "the value of a unit of the good increases with the expected number of units to 
be sold." Thus, the demand slopes downward but shifts upward with increases in 
the number of units expected to be sold. 
81t is already eliminated in some parts of the United Kingdom, where cable TV operators offer 
telephone s rvice at significantly lower prices than British Telecom. 
9 These significant changes incosts and the convergence of communications services open an number 
of policy questions on pricing, unbundling, deregulation, a d possibly mandated segmentation n this 
sector. It is possible that ownership breakup of local and long distance lines is no longer necessary to 
improve competition. For example, European Union policy mandates open competition by1998 in any 
part of the telecommunications network, but does not advocate vertical fragmentation of the existing 
integrated national monopolies; see European Commission (1994). The reduction i costs and the 
elimination of natural monopoly in many services may make it possible for this policy to lead the 
industry to competition. 
~°Another important etwork, the airline network, faces ignificant change in Europe. Airlines have 
not benefited from significant cost reductions and technological hange; the present reform is just the 
abolition by the European Union of the antiquated regime of national airline monopolies, and its 
replacement by a more competitive environment. 
N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699 679 
3.1. Sources of network externalities 
The key reason for the appearance of network externalities i the complemen- 
tarity between the components of a network. Depending on the network, the 
externality may be direct or indirect. When customers are identified with 
components, the externality is direct. Consider for example a typical two-way 
network, such as the local telephone network of Fig. 2. In this n-component 
network, there are n(n -  1) potential goods. An additional (n + l th) customer 
provides direct externalities to all other customers in the network by adding 2n 
potential new goods through the provision of a complementary link (say ES) to the 
existing links. 11 
In typical one-way networks, the externality is only indirect. When there are m 
varieties of component A and n varieties of component B as in Fig. 4 (and all 
A-type goods are compatible with all B-type), there are mn potential composite 
goods. An extra customer yields indirect externalities to other customers, by 
increasing the demand for components of types A and B and thereby (because of 
the presence of economies of scale) potentially increasing the number of varieties 
of each component that are available in the market. 
Financial exchange networks also exhibit indirect network externalities. There 
are two ways in which these externalities arise. First, externalities arise in the act 
of exchanging assets or goods. Second, externalities may arise in the array of 
vertically related services that compose a financial transaction. These include the 
services of a broker, of bringing the offer to the floor, matching the offer, etc. The 
second type of externalities are similar to other vertically related markets. The first 
way in which externalities arise in financial markets is more important. 
The act of exchanging oods or assets brings together a trader who is willing to 
sell with a trader who is willing to buy. The exchange brings together the two 
complementary goods, 'willingness to sell at price p'  (the 'offer') and 'willingness 
to buy at price p' (the 'counteroffer') and creates a composite good, the 'exchange 
transaction.' The two original goods were complementary and each had no value 
without he other one. Clearly, the availability of the counteroffer is critical for the 
exchange to occur. Put in terms commonly used in finance, minimal liquidity is 
necessary for the transaction to occur. 
Financial markets also exhibit positive size externalities in the sense that the 
increasing size (or thickness) of an exchange market increases the expected utility 
of all participants. Higher participation of traders on both sides of the market 
(drawn from the same distribution) decreases the variance of the expected market 
price and increases the expected utility of risk-averse traders. Ceteris paribus, 
~ This property of two-way networks was pointed out in telecommunications networks by Rohlfs 
(1974) in a very early paper on network externalities. See also Oren and Smith (1981). 
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higher liquidity increases traders' utility. Thus, financial exchange markets also 
exhibit network externalities. 12'13 
3.2. The 'macro'  approach 
There are two approaches and two strands of literature in the analysis of 
network externalities. The first approach assumes that network externalities exist, 
and attempts to model their consequences. I call this the 'macro' approach. 
Conceptually this approach is easier, and it has produced strong results. It was the 
predominant approach during the 80s. The second approach attempts to find the 
root cause of the network externalities. I call this the 'micro' approach. In 
industrial organization, it started with the analysis of mix-and-match models and 
has evolved to the analysis of various structures of vertically related markets. In 
finance, it started with the analysis of price dispersion models. The 'micro' 
approach is harder, and in many ways more constrained, as it has to rely on the 
underlying microstrncture. However, the 'micro' approach as a very significant 
benefit in defining the market structure. We discuss the 'macro' approach first. 
3.2.1. Perfect competition 
As we have noted earlier, network externalities arise out of the complementarity 
of different network pieces. Thus, they arise naturally in both one- and two-way 
networks, as well as in vertically related markets. The value of good X increases as 
more of the complementary good Y is sold, and vice versa. Thus, more of Y is sold 
as more X is sold. It follows that the value of X increases as more of it is sold. 
This positive feedback loop seems explosive, and indeed it would be, except for 
the inherent downward slope of the demand curve. To understand this better, 
consider a fulfilled expectations formulation of network externalities as in Katz 
and Shapiro (1985), Economides (1993b), Economides (1996a), and Economides 
and Himmelberg (1995). Let the willingness to pay for the nth unit of the good 
~2For a more detailed iscussion ofnetworks in finance see Economides (1993a). Economides and 
Schwartz (1995a) discuss how to set up electronic all markets that bunch transactions and execute 
them all at once. Call markets have inherently higher liquidity because they take advantage of network 
externalities in exchange. Thus, transaction costs are lower in call markets. Economides (1994a) and 
Economides and Heisler (1994) discuss how to increase liquidity in call markets. The survey of 
institutional investors eported by Economides and Schwartz (1995b) find that many traders who work 
in the present continuous market environment would be willing to wait a number of hours for execution 
of their orders if they can save in transaction costs, including bid-ask spreads. Thus, the time is right for 
the establishment of call markets inparallel operation with the continuous market. 
~3 The increase ofutility in expectation due to market thickness was pointed out by Economides and 
Siow (1988), and earlier and in less formal terms by Garbade and Silber (1976a), Garbade and Silber 
(1976b), and Garbade and Silber (1979). The effects are similar to those of search models as in 
Diamond (1982) and Diamond (1984). 
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when n e units are expected to be sold be p(n; ne). 14 This is a decreasing function of 
its first argument because the demand slopes downward, p(n; n e) increases in ne; 
this captures the network externalities effect. At a market equilibrium of the simple 
single-period world, expectations are fulfilled, n = n e, thus defining the fulfilled 
expectations demand p(n, n). Fig. 5 shows the construction of a typical fulfilled 
expectations demand. Each curve D i, i = 1 ... . .  4, shows the willingness to pay for 
a varying quantity n, given an expectation of sales n e = ni. At n = n i, expectations 
are fulfilled and the point belongs to p(n, n) as p(ni, ng). Thus p(n, n) is constructed 
as a collection of points p(n i, n~). 
To avoid explosions and infinite sales, it is reasonable to impose limn_~ p(n, 
n) = 0; it then follows that p(n, n) is decreasing for large n. Economides and 
Himmelberg (1995) show that the fulfilled expectations demand is increasing for 
small n if either one of three conditions hold: (i) the utility of every consumer in a 
network of zero size is zero, or (ii) there are immediate and large external benefits 
to network expansion for very small networks, or (iii) there is a significant density 
c,p 
D1 ~/  
0 
p(n,n) 
f I I i I I 
n 1 n2 n3n 4 n ° 1 
Fig. 5. Construction of the fulfilled expectations demand. 
L 
n 
]4In this formulation n and n e are normalized so that they represent market shares rather than 
absolute quantities. 
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of high-willingness-to-pay consumers who are just indifferent on joining a network 
of approximately zero size. The first condition is straightforward and applies 
directly to all two-way networks. The other two conditions are a bit more subtle, 
but commonly observed in networks and vertically related industries. 
When the fulfilled expectations demand increases for small n, we say that the 
network exhibits a positive critical mass under perfect competition. This means 
that, if we imagine a constant marginal cost c decreasing parametrically, the 
network will start at a positive and significant size n ° (corresponding to marginal 
cost c°). For each smaller marginal cost, c < c °, there are three network sizes 
consistent with marginal cost pricing: a zero size network; an unstable network 
size at the first intersection of the horizontal through c with p(n, n); and the Pareto 
optimal stable network size at the largest intersection of the horizontal with p(n, n). 
The multiplicity of equilibria is a direct result of the coordination problem that 
arises naturally in the typical network externalities model. In such a setting, it is 
natural to assume that the Pareto optimal network size will result. 15 
In the presence of network externalities, it is evident hat perfect competition is 
inefficient: The marginal social benefit of network expansion is larger than the 
benefit that accrues to a particular firm under perfect competition. Thus, perfect 
competition will provide a smaller network than is socially optimal, and for some 
relatively high marginal costs perfect competition will not provide the good while 
it is socially optimal to provide it. 
One interesting question that remains virtually unanswered is how to decentral- 
ize the welfare maximizing solution in the presence of network externalities. 
Clearly, the welfare maximizing solution can be implemented through perfect 
price discrimination, but typically such discrimination is unfeasible. It remains to 
be seen to what extent mechanisms that allow for non-linear pricing and self- 
selection by consumers will come close to the first best. 
3.2.2. Monopoly 
Economides and Himmelberg (1995) show that a monopolist who is unable to 
price-discriminate will support a smaller network and charge higher prices than 
perfectly competitive firms. This is despite the fact that the monopolist has 
influence over the expectations of the consumers, and he recognizes this influence, 
while no perfectly competitive firm has such influence. 16 Influence over expecta- 
tions drives the monopolist o higher production, but the monopolist's profit- 
maximizing tendency towards restricted production is stronger and leads it to 
~sIt is possible to have other shapes of the fulfilled expectations demand. In general p(n, n) is 
quasiconcave under weak conditions on the distribution of preferences and the network externality 
function. Then, if none of the three causes mentioned above are not present, the fulfilled expectations 
demand is downward sloping. 
~rA monopolist unable to influence expectations will clearly produce less than a monopolist able to 
influence expectations. 
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lower production levels than perfect competition. Thus, consumers and total 
surplus will be lower in monopoly than in perfect competition. Therefore the 
existence of network externalities does not reverse the standard welfare com- 
parison between monopoly and competition; it follows that the existence of 
network externalities cannot be claimed as a reason in favor of a monopoly 
market structure. 
3.2.3. Oligopoly and monopolistic ompetition under compatibility 
Cournot oligopolists producing compatible components also have some in- 
fluence over expectations. A natural way to model the influence of oligopolists on 
output expectations i to assume that every oligopolist takes the output of all 
others as given and sets the expectation of consumers of his own output. In this 
setting, M compatible Cournot oligopolists upport a network of a size between 
monopoly (M = 1) and perfect competition (M = 2). The analysis can easily be 
extended to monopolistic ompetition among compatible oligopolists if firms face 
downward-sloping average cost curves as shown in Fig. 6. Firms produce on the 
downward-sloping part of the firm-scaled fulfilled expectations demand. At a 
symmetric equilibrium, firm j ' s  output is determined at the intersection of 
marginal cost c and marginal revenue MRj. Price is read off the fulfilled 
expectations firm-scaled inverse demand p(Mq, Mq). At a monopolistically 
competitive quilibrium, the AC curve is tangent o the fulfilled expectations 
demand at q~. 
Monopolistic Competition with Network 
Externalities and M Compatible Goods 
P 
C 0 _ ~'_ -_. 
.;'- Ac 
J 
0 qO qj q 
Fig. 6. Monopolistic competition with network externalities and M compatible goods. 
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3.2.4. Oligopoly under incompatibility 
One of the most interesting issues in the economics of networks is the 
interaction of oligopolists producing incompatible goods. A full analysis of such a 
market, in conjunction with the analysis of compatible oligopolists, will allow us 
to determine the incentives of individual firms to choose technologies that are 
compatible or incompatible with others. 
Given any set of firms S = {1 ..... N}, we can identify a subset of S that adheres 
to the same technical 'standard' as a coalition. Then the partition of S into subsets 
defines a coalition structure C s = {C 1 .....  Ck}. Compatibility by all firms means 
that there is a single coalition that includes all firms. Total incompatibility, where 
every firm adheres to its own unique standard, means that k = N. 
A number of criteria can be used to define the equilibrium coalition structure. A
purely non-cooperative concept without side payments requires that, after a firm 
joins a coalition, it is better off at the resulting market equilibrium, just from 
revenues from its own sales. ~7 At a non-cooperative quilibrium with side 
payments, firms divide the profits of a coalition arbitrarily to induce firms to join a 
coalition. Yet firms do not cooperate in output decisions. Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
show that the level of industry output is greater under compatibility than at any 
equilibrium with some incompatible firm(s). This is not sufficient o characterize 
the incentives of firms to opt for compatibility. 
Intuitively, a firm benefits from a move to compatibility if (i) the marginal 
externality is strong; (ii) it joins a large coalition; and (iii) it does not thereby 
increase competition to a significant degree by its action. On the other hand, the 
coalition benefits from a firm joining its 'standard' if (i) the marginal externality is 
strong; (ii) the firm that joins the coalition is large; (iii) competition does not 
increase significantly as a result of the firm joining the coalition. Clearly, in both 
cases, the second and the third criteria may create incentives that are in conflict; 
this will help define the equilibrium coalition structure. 18
Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that if the costs of achieving compatibility are 
lower for all firms than the increase in profits because of compatibility, then the 
industry move toward compatibility is socially beneficial. However, it may be true 
that the (fixed) cost of achieving compatibility is larger than the increase in profits 
for some firms, while these costs are lower than the increase in total surplus from 
compatibility. Then profit maximizing firms will not achieve industry-wide 
compatibility while this regime is socially optimal. Further, if a change leads to 
less than industry-wide compatibility, the private incentives to standardize may be 
excessive or inadequate. This is because of the output changes that a change of 
regime has on all firms. Similarly, the incentive of a firm to produce a one-way 
adapter, that allows it to achieve compatibility without affecting the compatibility 
~TSee Economides (1984), Yi and Shin (1992a), and Yi and Shin (1992b). 
~8 Economides and Flyer (1995) examine the incentives for coalition formation around compatibility 
standards. 
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of other firms, may be deficient or excessive because the firm ignores the change it 
creates on other firms' profits and on consumers urplus. 
3.2.5. Coordination to technical standards with asymmetric technologies 
So far it was assumed that the cost of standardization was fixed and the same for 
both firms. If standardization costs are different, firms play a standards coordina- 
tion game. A 2 × 2 version of this game is presented in Fig. 7. Entries represent 
profits. In this game, we will assume that firm i has higher profits when 'its' 
standard i get adopted, a > g, b < h. Profits, in case of disagreement, will depend 
on the particulars of the industry. One standard assumption that captures many 
industries is that in case of disagreement profits will be lower than those of either 
standard, e, c <g;  d, f<b.  Under these circumstances, the setting of either 
• • - 19  standard will constitute a non-cooperative equlhbrmm. There is no guarantee that 
the highest joint profit standard will be adopted. Since consumers surplus does not 
appear in the matrix, there is no guarantee of maximization of social welfare at 
equilibrium. For an analysis with continuous choice of standard specification see 
Berg (1988). 
3.3. The 'micro' approach 
The micro approach starts with an analysis of the specific micro-structure of a 
network. After identifying the physical aspects of a network, such as nodes and 
links, we identify the goods and services that are demanded on the network. We 
distinguish between the case where only end-to-end services are demanded and the 
case when there is also demand for some services that do not reach from end to 
end. The case when only end-to-end services exist is easier and has been dealt with 
in much more detail in the literature. However, many important networks, such as 
the railroad and telephone networks, provide both end-to-end and partial coverage 
service. We examine this case later. 
We start with a simple case where only end-to-end services are demanded. 
Suppose that there are two complementary types of goods, A and B. Suppose that 
Player i 
Standard 1 
Player 2 
Standard 2 
Standard 1 I (a, b) (c, d) 
Standard 2 (e, f) (g, h) 
.~. 
Fig. 7. 
E9Standard 1 is an equilibrium if a > e, b > d. Similarly, Standard 2 is an equilibrium if g > c, h >f .  
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each type of good has a number of brands available, Ai, i = 1 ..... m, Bj, j = 1 ..... 
n, as in Fig. 4. Let consumers demand 1:1 combinations AkB J. We call each of the 
complementary goods A i or ~ components, while the combined good AiBj is 
called a composite good or system. Potentially all combinations A~Bj, i = 1 ..... m; 
j = 1 ..... n, are possible. Thus complementarity exists in potential. Complemen- 
tarity is actualized when the components A i and Bj are combinable and function 
together without extra cost, i.e. when the components are compatible. Often it is an 
explicit decision of the producers of individual components to make their products 
compatible with those of other producers. Thus, compatibility is a strategic 
decision and should be analyzed as such. 
Modern industrial organization provides a rich collection of environments for 
the analysis of strategic decisions; because of shortage of time and space, this 
survey will discuss the decision on compatibility only in few environments. 
3.3.1. Mix and match: compatibility vs. incompatibility 
The mix-and-match literature does not assume a priori network externalities; 
however, it is clear that demand in mix-and-match models exhibits network 
externalities. The mix-and-match approach was originated by Matutes and 
Regibeau (1988), and followed by Economides (1988), Economides (1989), 
Economides (199 la), Economides (199 lb), Economides (1993c), Economides and 
Salop (1992), Economides and Lehr (1995), Matutes and Regibeau (1989), 
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), and others. To fix ideas, consider the case of Fig. 4 
with m = 2, n = 2, technologies are known, coordination is costless, price 
discrimination is not allowed, and there are no cost asymmetries created by any 
particular compatibility standard. Fig. 8 shows the case of compatibility. The 
incentive for compatibility of a vertically integrated firm (producing A 1 and B~) 
depends on the relative sizes of each combination of complementary components. 
Reciprocal compatibility, (i.e. simultaneous compatibility between A I and B 2, as 
well as between A 2 and B~) increases demand (by allowing for the sale of A IB2 
and AzBI )  but also increases competition for the individual components. There- 
A 1 A 2 
B 1 B 2 
Fig. 8. Mix-and-match compatibility. 
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fore, when the hybrid demand is large compared with the own-product demand 
(including the case where the two demands are equal at equal prices), a firm has an 
incentive to want compatibility. 2° When the demand for hybrids is small, a firm 
does not want compatibility• Thus, it is possible, with two vertically integrated 
firms, that one firm wants compatibility (because it has small own-product demand 
compared with the hybrids demand) while the other one prefers incompatibility 
(because its own-product demand is large compared with the hybrids demand). 
Thus, there can be conflict across firms in their incentives for compatibility, even 
when the technology is well known. The presumption is that opponents will not be 
able to counteract and correct all incompatibilities introduced by an opponent, and, 
therefore, in situations of conflict we expect that incompatibility wins. 
These results hold both for zero-one decisions (i.e. compatibility vs. incom- 
patibility) and for decisions of partial (or variable) incompatibility. The intuition of 
the pro-compatibility result for the zero-one decision in the equal hybrid- and 
own-demand is simple. Starting from the same level of prices and demand in both 
the compatibility and incompatibility regimes, consider a price increase in one 
component hat produces the same decrease in demand in both regimes. Under 
incompatibility, the loss of profits is higher since systems ales are lost rather than 
sales of one component. Therefore, profits are more responsive to price under 
incompatibility; it follows that the residual demand facing firms is more elastic 
under incompatibility, and therefore firms will choose lower prices in that 
regime. 2' This is reminiscent of Cournot's (1838) celebrated result (see Cournot, 
1927) that a vertically integrated monopolist faces a more elastic demand and will 
choose a lower price than the sum of the prices of two vertically disintegrated 
• 22  monopohsts. 
So far we have assumed that compatibility is reciprocal - i.e. that the same 
adapter is required to make both A ~B 2 and A2B ~ functional. If compatibility is not 
reciprocal (i.e. if different adapters are required for A ~B 2 and A 2B1) the incentive 
of firms to achieve compatibility depends on the cross substitution between 
own-products and hybrids. Roughly, if the substitutability among A-type com- 
ponents is equal to the substitutability among B-type components, the earlier 
results of the reciprocal setup still hold. 23 Nevertheless, if the degree of sub- 
stitutability among the As is different han among the Bs, one firm may create an 
2C~Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) find that compatibility is always the firms' 
choice because they assume a locational setting with uniform distribution of consumers in space that 
results in equal own-product and hybrid demands atequal prices. The exposition here follows the more 
general framework of Economides (1988) and Economides (1991a). 
Z'These results also hold when firms can price discriminate between buyers who buy the pure 
combination A~B and buyers who buy only one component from firm i. Thus, firms practice mixed 
bundling. See Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Economides (1993c). 
22 See Economides (1988) for a discussion of Cournot's result, and Economides and Salop (1992) for 
an extension of the result o (parallel) vertical integration among two pairs of vertically related firms. 
23Economides (1991a, p. 52). 
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advantage for itself by introducing some incompatibilities. However, it is never to 
the advantage of both vertically integrated firms to create incompatibilities. 
The issue of compatibility and coordination is much more complicated if there 
are more than two firms. A number of coalitions can each be formed around a 
specific technical standard, and standards may allow for partial compatibility, or 
may be mutually incompatible. Not enough research as been done on this issue. 
Research in this area is made particularly difficult by the lack of established 
models of coalition formation in non-cooperative s ttings. The analysis based on 
coalition structures is more complicated in the 'micro' approach because of the 
specifics of the ownership structure. 
The studies we referred to this far take the ownership structure as given (i.e. as 
parallel vertical integration), and proceed to discuss the choice of the degree of 
compatibility. In many cases, vertical integration is a decision that is more flexible 
(and less irreversible) than a decision on compatibility. Thus, it makes sense to 
think of a game structure where the choice of technology (which implies the 
degree of compatibility) precedes the choice of the degree of vertical integration. 
Economides (1996b) analyzes the choice of asset ownership as a consequence of 
the choice of technology (and of the implied degree of compatibility). It posits a 
three-stage game of compatibility choice in the first stage, vertical integration in 
the second stage, and price choice in the third stage. Incentives for vertical 
mergers in industries with varying degrees of compatibility are compared. In 
analyzing the stage of compatibility choice, the influence of the anticipation of 
decisions on (vertical) industry structure on compatibility decisions is evaluated. 
(Fig. 9.) 
3.3.2. Changes in the number of varieties as a result of compatibility decisions 
Economides (1991b) considers the interplay of compatibility and the number of 
varieties of complementary goods. There are two types of goods, A and B, 
consumed in 1:1 ratio. There are two brands of good A, A~ and A 2, each produced 
by an independent firm. The number of B-type brands, each also produced by an 
independent firm, is determined by a free-entry condition, so that industry B is in 
monopolistic competition. In a regime of compatibility, each B-type component is
immediately compatible with either A 1 or A z. In a regime of incompatibility, each 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
COMPATIBILITY 
OR 
INCOMPATIBILITY 
VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION OR 
DISINEGRATION 
PRICE 
COMPETITION 
Fig. 9. Compatibility decisions are less flexible than vertical integration decisions. 
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Compatibility 
Fig. 10. Compatibility. 
brand B i produces two versions, one compatible with A 1 and one compatible with 
A 2. The two cases are shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. 
Under incompatibility, each B-type firm incurs higher fixed costs; it follows that 
ceteris paribus the number of B-type brands will be smaller under incompatibility. 
An A-type firm prefers incompatibility or compatibility according to the equilib- 
rium profits it realizes in each regime. These profits, and the decision on 
compatibility, depends on the specifics of the utility function of consumers, and in 
particular on the impact of an increase of the number of varieties on utility. If 
Incompatibility 
a; aj ... a ,  
Fig. 11. Incompatibilty. 
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industry demand is not sensitive to increases in the number of varieties of 
composite goods n (and does not increase much as n increases), then equilibrium 
profits of an A-type firm decrease in the number of firms; therefore profits of an 
A-type firm are higher at the smaller number of firms implied by incompatibility, 
and an A-type firm prefers incompatibility. Conversely, when consumers have a 
strong preference for variety and demand for composite goods increases sig- 
nificantly in n, equilibrium profits of an A-type firm increase in the number of 
firms; therefore its profits are higher at the larger number of firms implied by 
compatibility, and an A-type firm prefers compatibility. 
Church and Gandal (1992b), Chou and Shy (1990a), Chou and Shy (1990b), and 
Chou and Shy (1990c) also examine the impact of the number of varieties of 
complementary (B-type) goods on the decisions of consumers to buy one of the 
A-type goods under conditions of incompatibility. 
3.3.3. Quality coordination in mix-and-match 
The framework of mix and match models applies to both variety and quality 
features that are combinable additively in the utility function. That is, in the 
standard mix-and-match model, the utility accruing to a consumer from component 
A i is added to the utility from component Bj. However, in some networks, 
• • 24  including telecommumcatlons, the utility of the composite good AiBj is not the 
sum of the respective qualities. In particular, the quality of voice in a long distance 
call is the minimum of the qualities of the component parts of the network, i.e. the 
local and the long distance transmission. Thus, significant quality coordination 
problems arise in a network with fragmented ownership• Economides (1994b) and 
Economides and Lehr (1995) examine this coordination problem. 
Let A and B be components hat are combinable in a 1:1 ratio. Suppose that the 
quality levels of the components are qa and qB, while the quality level of the 
composite good is qa8 = min(qA, qB)" Consumers have varying willingness to pay 
for quality improvements as in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and 
Sutton (1982), and firms play a two-stage game of quality choice in the first stage, 
followed by price choice in the second stage. As mentioned earlier, Cournot 
(1927) has shown that an integrated monopolist producing both A and B will 
charge less than two vertically related monopolists, each producing one component 
only. This is because of the elimination of double marginalization by the 
integrated monopolist• Economides (1994b) and Economides and Lehr (1995) 
show that an integrated monopolist also provides a higher quality than the two 
independent monopolists. In bilateral monopoly, marginal increases in quality have 
a bigger impact on price. Being able to sell the same quality at a higher price than 
under integrated monopoly, the bilateral monopolists choose lower quality levels, 
which are less costly• Despite that, because of double marginalization, prices are 
Z4See also Encaoua et al. (1992) for a discussion ofthe coordination f the timing of different legs 
of airport transportation. 
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higher than in integrated monopoly, a lower portion of the market is served, and 
firms realize lower profits 25 Thus, lack of  vertical integration leads" to a reduction 
in quality. Note that this is not because of lack of coordination between the 
bilateral monopolists in the choice of quality, since they both choose the same 
quality level 26 
In this setting, Economides and Lehr (1995) examine various ownership 
structures where, for at least one of the types of components here is more than one 
quality level available. Clearly, a situation where all components have the same 
quality is not viable, since competition would then drive prices to marginal cost. 
Further, for a 'high' quality composite good to be available, both an A- and a 
B-type goods must be of 'high' quality. They find that a third (and fourth) ' low' 
quality goods have a hard time surviving if they are produced by independent 
firms. In contrast, in parallel vertical integration (with firm i, i = 1, 2, producing A i 
and Bi), firms prefer not to interconnect - i.e. to produce components that are 
incompatible with those of the opponent. 
4. Network externalities and industry structure 
4.1. Invitations to enter 
In the presence of strong network externalities, a monopolist exclusive holder of 
a technology may have an incentive to invite competitors and even subsidize them. 
The realization of network externalities requires high output. A monopolist may be 
unable credibly to commit to a high output as long as he is operating by himself. 
However, if he licenses the technology to a number of firms and invites them to 
enter and compete with him, market output will be higher; and since the level of 
market output depends mainly upon other firms, the commitment to high output is 
credible. 
The invitation to enter and the consequent increase in market output has two 
effects; a competitive ffect and a network effect. The competitive ffect is an 
expected increase in competition because of the increase of the number of firms. 
The network effect tends to increase the willingness to pay and the market price 
because of the high expected sales. Economides (1993h) and Economides (1996a) 
show that, if the network externality is strong enough, the network effect is larger 
than the competitive ffect, and therefore an innovator-monopolist nvites com- 
petitors and even subsidizes them on the margin to induce them to increase 
production. 
25 Consumers also receive lower surplus in comparison tovertically integrated monopoly. 
26The reliability of the network, measured bythe percentage of time that he network isin operation, 
or by the probability of a successful connection, is measured by the product of the respective 
reliabilities of the components (another non-linear function). 
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.6, 
2 
B C 
3 
Fig. 12. AB is a bottleneck facility. 
4.2. Interconnection or foreclosure by a local monopolist? 
Many telecommunications, airline networks and railroad networks have the 
structure of Fig. 12. In a railroad network, there may be direct consumer demand 
for links AB, BC, as well as AC. This figure can also represent a telephone 
network with demand for local telephone services (AB) and for long distance 
services (ABC); in that case, there is no direct demand for BC, but only the 
indirect demand arising from long distance calls ABC. In many cases, one firm has 
a monopoly of a link that is necessary for a number of services (here AB), and this 
link is a natural monopoly. This bottleneck link is often called an essential facility. 
The monopolist can foreclose any finn by denying access to the bottleneck facility. 
What are his incentives do so? 
Economides and Woroch (1992) examine intermodal competition i  the context 
of a simple network pictured in Fig. 13. S and R are local switches; AS and BR is 
local service (in different cities); SR and STR are alternative long distance services. 
The diagram is simplified by eliminating R without any essential loss. Suppose 
that an integrated firm offers end-to-end service (ASB), while a second firm offers 
Network in Extensive and Collapsed Form 
A 
A 
SI IT 
B 
Fig. 13. Intermodal competition. 
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service of partial coverage only (STB). They find that, although the integrated firm 
has the opportunity to foreclose the opponent, it prefers not to. In fact, the 
integrated firm is better off by implementing a vertical price squeeze on the 
opponent, and charging a significantly higher price to the opponent for the use of 
the monopolized link than it 'charges' itself. 27 Thus, foreclosure, although feasible, 
is not optimal for the integrated firm28 
Economides and Woroch (1992) also find that vertical disintegration is not 
desirable for the firm that offers end-to-end service. Once disintegrated, its 
constituent parts realize lower total profits. This is because, besides appropriating 
monopoly rents for its AS monopoly, the integrated firm (ASB) was creating a 
significant restriction of competition in SB-STB market by its de facto price 
discriminating strategy. After disintegration, the SB-STB market becomes much 
more competitive, even if AS price discriminates between SB and STB. Thus, even 
if network ASB were to receive the full rent earned by the new owner of SB, its 
after-divestiture profits would be lower than before divestiture 29 
Even in simple networks, there may be relations among firms that are neither 
purely vertical nor purely horizontal. Thus, the conventional wisdom about vertical 
and horizontal integration fails. Economides and Salop (1992) discuss pricing in 
various ownership structures in the model of Fig. 8. They call the ownership 
structure of this figure, where each firm produces a component of each type, 
parallel vertical integration. They also consider the independent ownership 
structure, where each of the four components i owned by a different firm. In both 
of these structures, no firm is purely vertically or purely horizontally related to 
another firm. Thus, starting from independent ownership, or starting from parallel 
vertical integration, a merger to joint ownership, where all components are 
produced by the same firm, can either increase or decrease prices. Thus, simple 
prescriptions against mergers may easily fail. 
In the model of Fig. 13, Economides and Woroch (1992) consider the case 
where link ST is owned by a firm that owns a vertically related link (either AS or 
BT), or is owned by an independent firm. Clearly, the strategic structure of the 
game remains unaffected when link ST changes hands between two firms that also 
own a link that is vertically related to ST. Therefore, if ST has a fixed cost, it is a 
liability to such a firm; each firm would like the opponent to own it. However, if 
the link is owned by a third party, it is has a positive value because of its 
monopoly position in the chain. Thus, each original owner has an incentive to sell 
ST to a third party. The direct implication is that the value of links depends on 
27This result is dependent onthe linear structure of the demand system, and may not hold for any 
demand structure. 
28 Church and Gandal (1992a) find that sometimes firms prefer foreclosure, but their model does not 
allow for a vertical price squeeze. 
29This result is in contrast to Bonanno and Vickers (1988) because of the absence of two-part 
contracts in Economides and Woroch (1992). 
694 N. Economides / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 14 (1996) 673-699 
what other links a firm owns. Thus, general prescriptions on the desirability of 
unbundling of ownership are suspect. 
Often parts of the network are regulated, while other parts are not. This is the 
typical arrangement in telephony in the US, where only local telephone companies 
are tightly regulated, since their market is traditionally considered a natural 
monopoly. 3° Baumol and Sidak (1994a) and Baumol and Sidak (1994b) propose 
that, to attract efficient entrants in the long distance market and to discourage 
inefficient entrants, a local telephone company should charge them an interconnec- 
tion (or access ) fee  equal to the marginal cost of provision of service plus any 
opportunity cost that the local telephone company incurs. 3~ This is correct under a 
set of strict assumptions: first that the end-to-end good is sold originally at the 
competitive price; second that the entrant produces the same complementary good 
(long distance service) as the incumbent; 32 third, that there are no economies of 
scale in either one of the complements. Economides and White (1995) and 
Economides and White (1996) discuss how the relaxation of these assumptions 
leads to different interconnection charges. For example, if competition between an 
entrant and the incumbent reduces the market power of the incumbent, entry may 
increase social welfare even when the entrant produces at higher cost than the 
incumbent. 
5. Sequential games 
In network markets, and more generally in markets with network externalities, 
when firms and consumers interact in more than period, history matters. Both 
consumers and firms make production and consumption decisions based on sizes 
of installed base and on expectations of its increases over time. The same 
underlying technology and consumers preferences and distribution can lead to 
different industrial structures depending on the way things start. Thus, strategic 
advantages, uch as first mover advantages, can have long run effects. 33 
Network externalities and historical events are particularly important in the 
speed of adoption of an innovation that creates services on a network. Cabral 
(1990) discusses the adoption of innovations under perfect competition in the 
presence of network externalities. His main conclusion is that, when network 
externalities are strong, the equilibrium adoption path may be discontinuous. This 
3°This is changing for some customers through the existence of competitive access providers, who 
directly compete with the local telephone company for large customers, and the potential for 
competition by cable companies. 
3~ Kahn and Taylor (1994) have very similar views. 
32Armstrong and Doyle (1994) relax this assumption. 
33 See Arthur (1988), Arthur (1989), David (1985). David argues that the QWERTY keyboard was 
adopted mainly because it appeared first while the DVORAK keyboard was superior. This is disputed 
by Liebowitz and Margolis (1990). 
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is another way of saying that there are two network sizes supported as equilibria at 
the same time instant. This may occur at the start of the network, and then it is 
called positive critical mass by Economides and Himmelberg (1995). It may also 
occur at other points in the network evolution. In practice, discontinuities in the 
size of the network over time do not occur since that would imply an infinite size 
of sales at some points in time. Continuity and smoothness of the network path is 
restored if instantaneous marginal production costs are increasing. Under this 
assumption, Economides and Himmelberg (1995) find that the adoption path is 
much steeper in the presence of externalities. Further, driven by the externality, in 
early stages the network can expand so quickly as to exhibit increasing retail 
prices even when marginal costs are falling over time. Their analysis is applied to 
the fax market in the US and Japan. 
The analysis is more complex when we depart from the assumption of perfect 
competition. Accordingly, this analysis tends to be in the form of simple two- 
period models. We analyze it with reference to the standard simultaneous choice 
coordination game of Section 3.2.5, where we now interpret he first strategy as 
sticking to the old technology, and the second as the adoption of a new one (Fig. 
14). Network externalities for both technologies mean that a > c, e; b > d, f;  
g > c, e; h > d, f. If both firms are worse off when they are not coordinated, both 
the 'new technology' (i.e. (N, N)) and the 'old technology' (i.e. (O, O)) will arise 
as equilibria. Clearly, one of the equilibria can be inefficient. If the (O, O) 
equilibrium is inefficient and is adopted, Farrell and Saloner (1985) call the 
situation excess  iner t ia .  34 Similarly, if the (N, N) equilibrium is inefficient and it is 
adopted, the situation is called excess  momentum.  
Farrell and Saloner (1985) discuss a two-period model where consumers have 
varying willingness to pay for the change of the technology, measured by 0. Users 
can switch in Period 1 or 2, and switching is irreversible. Users fall in four 
categories according to the strategy they pick: (i) they never switch, whatever the 
behavior of others in the first period; (ii) they switch in Period 2 if other users 
Player 2 
New Technology Old Technology 
"N . . . .  O" 
Player 1 
New Technology,,N,, l (a, b) (c, d) 
Old Technology (e, f) (g, h) 
"O" 
Fig. 14. 
34See Katz and Shapiro (1992) for a different view arguing for excess momentum (which they call 
insufficient friction). 
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have switched in Period 1 - jumping on the bandwagon; (iii) they switch in Period 
1; (iv) switch in Period 2 even if others have not switched in Period 1. The last 
strategy is dominated by strategy (iii). Consumers of low 0 use strategy (i), 
consumers of intermediate 0 use strategy (ii), and consumers of high 0 use strategy 
(iii). Consumers would like to coordinate themselves and switch in the first period 
(thereby getting the bandwagon rolling) but are unable to do so, thus creating 
excess inertia. This inertia can be reduced through communication among the 
consumers, though contracts, through coordination in committees or through new 
product sponsorship and special introductory pricing. 35 
In a sequential setting, preannouncement (i.e. announcement of a new product 
before its introduction) may induce some users to delay their purchase. Also 
penetration pricing can be important. Katz and Shapiro (1986a) examine the 
effects of sponsorship (allowing firms to price differently than at marginal cost). 
Katz and Shapiro (1986b) examine the effects of uncertainty in product adoption 
and introduction. 
Nevertheless, there is much more work to be done on multiperiod and on 
continuous time dynamic games with network externalities. The issues of 
foreclosure and predation have not been sufficiently discussed in the context of 
network externalities. More generally, much more work is required on multiperiod 
dynamic games in this context, especially for durable goods. 
6. Markets for adapters and add-ons 
Not enough research as been done on the economics of adapters and interfaces. 
One strand of the mix-and-match literature assumes that compatibilities introduced 
by one firm cannot be corrected by the other, so that adapters are unfeasible. 
Economides (1991a) assumes that adapters are provided by a competitive industry 
at cost, but decisions of the firms determine the extent of incompatibility, and 
therefore the cost of the adapters. Farrell and Saloner (1992) assume that 
converters make the technologies only partially compatible, in the sense that 
hybrid goods that utilize incompatible components as well as an adapter give 
lower utility than a system composed of fully compatible components. In this 
framework, the availability of converters can reduce social welfare, since, in the 
presence of converters, ome consumers would buy the converter and the 'inferior' 
technology rather than the 'best' technology, although the 'best' technology gives 
more externalities. 
35See also Farrell and Saloner (1988) for mechanisms to achieve coordination, and Farrell and 
Saloner (1985) for a discussion of network product sponsorship. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have noted some of the interesting issues that arise in networks 
and vertically related industries, especially in the presence of a fragmented 
ownership structure. As is evident, many open questions remain. One of the most 
important issues that remains largely unresolved is the joint determination of an 
equilibrium arket structure (including the degree of vertical integration) together 
with the degree of compatibility across firms. The extent of standardization i  
markets with more than two participants and the structure of 'standards' coalitions 
also remain open questions. Markets for adapters and add-ons have not been 
sufficiently analyzed. An analysis of market structure in multiperiod ynamic 
games with network externalities i also unavailable. Further, issues of predation 
and foreclosure in networks have not been fully analyzed yet. On a more 
fundamental level, there is no good prediction yet of the 'break points' that define 
the complementary components in a modular design structure. Even if these break 
points are known, little analysis has been done of competition in a multilayered 
structure of vertically related components. Nevertheless, it is exactly this kind of 
modelling that is needed for an analysis and evaluation of the potential structures 
of the 'information superhighway'. 
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